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Abstract in English 
This study analyses macro elasticities of the gross yearly wage per employee. From some 90 
books, articles and working papers, more than 1000 elasticities have been extracted. The results 
indicate that the dynamic specification of the wage equation, the choice of explanatory variables 
and restrictions on estimated coefficients all have their impact on estimated elasticities. From 
the results, we generate benchmark values for each type of elasticity that may be useful to 
calibrate policy simulation models. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
Dit onderzoek probeert de variatie in macro loonelasticiteiten te verklaren vanuit 
studiekarakteristieken met behulp van een meta-analyse. Uit 90 artikelen en boeken zijn 
ongeveer 1000 elasticiteiten gedestilleerd. De resultaten geven aan dat met name de specificatie 
van de oorspronkelijke vergelijking belangrijk is. Op basis van de uitkomsten is het mogelijk 
om per type elasticiteit een referentiewaarde te bepalen. Deze kunnen hun waarde bewijzen bij 
de kalibratie van modellen voor beleidsanalyse. 
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Summary 
This study analyses macro wage elasticities. From some 90 books, articles and working papers, 
more than 1000 elasticities have been extracted and computed. These concern elasticities of pay 
on labour productivity, payroll taxes, average and marginal income tax, consumer and producer 
prices, the net replacement ratio and the unemployment rate. There is a wide variety in applied 
wage definitions, so the first step is to transform elasticities to meet a common wage definition: 
the gross yearly wage per employee. Next, the data have been analyzed in eight separate meta 
analyses. These aim to attribute differences in each elasticity of pay to variations in study 
characteristics, economic or institutional variables and the econometric specification of 
underlying wage equations? I have used dummy variables that discriminate between country 
blocks, time periods, estimation techniques and econometric specifications. Due to the limited 
size of the common sample of all types of elasticities, variations in each type have been 
analyzed separately rather than in one system regression.  
I have applied the robust Least Absolute Deviation estimator rather than common Least 
Squares methods that are more sensitive to outliers. The results indicate that notably the 
econometric specification of the reported wage equation matters. The dynamic specification, the 
choice of explanatory variables and restrictions on estimated coefficients all have their impact 
on estimated elasticities. For example, the reported value of the output price elasticity of pay is 
sensitive to restrictions on the consumer price and vice versa. In case of tax elasticities, the 
dynamic specification matters, and the value of the replacement ratio elasticity of pay based on 
sectoral data is higher than the one obtained from macro data. The results for the unemployment 
elasticity of pay are close to those found in the wage curve literature. Finally, from the results I 
have generated benchmark values for each type of elasticity.    9 
1  Wages through the ages 
Many studies have investigated the impact of wages on economic performance. Roughly 
spoken, there are three lines of approach. The first explores the relation between wages, 
production and prices. This research was partly triggered by high inflation rates in de sixties and 
seventies of the 20th century (see e.g. Nickell (1987)). The second line focuses on wages and 
unemployment, initiated in 1958 by A.W. Phillips in his classic review on the relation between 
the rate of change of nominal wages and unemployment. Although his approach has been 
questioned (see e.g. Phelps (1968), Blanchflower and Oswald (1994)), high or persistent 
unemployment has triggered a lot of research to closely examine wage formation (Drèze and 
Bean (1990), Layard et al (1991)). A third scope is linked to economic policy reforms 
(Sørensen (1997)). The use of large computer models to analyze the possible impact of policy 
reforms on the performance of the labour market requires a sound theoretical and empirical 
underpinning of the role of wages (see also Graafland et al (2001)).  
Empirical information is mainly summarized through estimated wage elasticities. This is of 
major practical importance, as irrespective the theoretical model, it is virtually always possible 
to derive and compute wage elasticities and compare the results with findings of others. Yet 
general overviews of elasticities are scarce. Partial overviews of tax (wedge) elasticities can be 
found in Calmfors and Nymoen (1990), Sørensen (1997), Leibfritz et al (1997) and van der 
Horst (2003). In addition, Graafland and Huizinga (1999) report replacement rate elasticities. 
The path breaking work of Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) on the wage curve supplies an 
extensive overview of unemployment elasticities of pay. In Blanchflower and Oswald (2005), 
they update the overview.  
The first goal of this paper is to provide an overview of long-run macro wage elasticities. 
Following the approach of Tyrvainen (1995) eight elasticities of interest have been selected: 
productivity, payroll taxes, average and marginal income tax, producer and consumer price, the 
net replacement ratio and the unemployment rate. The second aim is to explain the variation in 
elasticities across studies. To explore this, I perform a meta analysis for each type of elasticity. 
Finally, I use the results of these analyses to compute benchmark values for all elasticities of 
interest.  
A main issue in the analysis is the impact of parameter restrictions in the wage equation on 
computed elasticities. Wage equations may contain separate tax and price variables or tax and 
price wedges; does this yield different values of tax and price elasticities? Do real and nominal 
wage equations yield similar elasticities? Does the elasticity of the net replacement ratio change 
if we omit payroll taxes from the wage equation? We will deal explicitly with those problems of 
completeness, normalization and restrictions.  
The results indicate that the dynamic specification of the wage equation, the choice of 
explanatory variables and restrictions on estimated coefficients all have their impact on 
estimated elasticities. Short-term values of elasticities of payroll and income taxes differ from   10 
their long-term equivalents. If the output price or the consumer price is omitted from the wage 
equation, the elasticity of the remaining price is biased upwards. The value of the replacement 
ratio elasticity of pay based on sectoral data is higher than the one obtained from macro data. 
Finally, the results for the long-run macro unemployment elasticity of pay are close to those 
found in the wage curve literature.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is about the theoretical background of 
wage equations and the numerous definitions of the concept ‘wage’. In section 3, we discuss the 
construction and sample characteristics of the data. Section 4 deals with the specification of 
moderator variables and in section 5, I present the results of the meta analysis and compute 
benchmark values for all types of elasticities. Section 6 concludes. 
   11 
2  Wage equations and elasticities 
2.1  Wage formation in the literature 
In this paper, I do not formally derive a wage equation, yet it may be useful to summarize which 
variables may have an impact on wage formation. The neoclassical theory predicts that in the 
absence of unions, wages are determined by market clearing conditions only. At the other 
extreme, government measures may fully prescribe wage developments. In practice, usually 
both employers and unions have an impact on wage setting. 
In the standard wage bargaining theory, wages result from negotiations between employers’ 
and employees’ organizations (see e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991)). Efficiency in 
wage bargaining requires that all elements that affect the utility of the agents are subject of the 
wage bargain (Manning (1987)). As the wage resulting from the bargain has a decisive impact 
on the employment perspectives of the employees, an efficient bargain will include a contract 
on wages as well as on employment. In practice, employers’ organisations may prefer to 
negotiate on wages only: individual employers should be able to adjust employment to shifts in 
demand. The ‘right -to-manage’ model captures this situation: unions and employers 
organizations negotiate on wages only, whereas individual firms have the right to choose 
employment at desired levels.  
So, we may expect both variables that are related to consumer utility (consumer prices, 
income tax rates, the replacement ratio) and those that determine total profits and employment 
(payroll tax, productivity, output prices, unemployment rates) to have an impact on wage 
formation. 
In practical applications, three possible strategies exist. A number of authors (e.g. 
Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988), Brunello and Sonedda (2006), Dolado and Bentolila (1993)) 
start with a careful theoretical description of the labour market and the bargaining process and 
derives relations for wages, prices and (un)employment. These relations serve as a starting point 
for estimation and testing. This is a fruitful approach in developing a policy evaluation model or 
if one wants to add specific elements in the bargaining process that are not standard. A second 
line is to apply a common wage equation from the literature (Dolado et al (1986)), Lauer 
(1999), Nunziata (2005)). Finally, a number of papers directly specify a wage equation, usually 
inspired by a wage bargaining process but not formally derived from it. This is a common way 
if one ‘needs’ a wage equation to analyze e.g. wage stickiness, unemployment or inflation. 
Examples are Carruth and Schnabel (1993), Fritsche et al (2005), Guichard and Laffargue 
(2000) and Pehkonen (1999). 
A first practical implication is that wage equations may be ‘incomplete’: they do not contain 
all variables that are related to the elasticities of interest. Second, to collect wage elasticities it is 
not sufficient to search for publications on ‘wage equations’ or ‘wage formation’ but on has 
also to explore items like ‘unemployment ‘, ‘inflation’ and ‘tax policy’. A final point to note is   12 
that wage elasticities are not always reported, as sometimes it is beyond the scope of a 
publication. In those cases, they have to be computed; this usually implies that elasticities 
depend on specific values of additional variables.  
2.2  Selection of publications 
The data base contains 116 publications. The list is not exhaustive but it covers time series, 
cross section and panel data studies on countries and firms, published either in books, official 
journals or as working or conference papers. They have been collected mainly by scanning 
electronic issues of journals and publications of research institutes and conferences. In a second 
round, also relevant cited papers were examined.  
Two selection rules have been applied. First, the publication should contain an aggregate 
wage equation. The qualification ‘aggregate’ does not necessarily refer to average (contract) 
wage per worker in the whole economy; it may also be the average wage in a specific sector or 
region. I did not include individual earnings equations that link the wage of a specific person to 
his or her level of education, working experience, age, marital status, union membership, and 
other variables. In the wage curve literature, they play a crucial role and they are a rich source 
of information on the unemployment elasticity of pay. An additional reason not to use these 
elasticities in our study is that the unemployment elasticity of pay is also quite popular in macro 
wage equations: the number of elasticities in the meta sample exceeds 200.  
The second criterion is the computational effort required to extract the desired elasticities. 
As they could not be computed directly from data supplied by the authors generally, I 
extensively used the Labour Market Institutions Database of Nunziata and Nickell (2001). In a 
number of cases, I decided not to include publications in the data base as very specific 
additional data were needed. For example: average regional or sectoral unemployment rates for 
a given period, the average opportunity wage outside the manufacturing industry or income tax 
rates for specific population groups.  
2.3  Intra and inter study variation 
The distinction between within-study and between-study variation in wage elasticities needs 
specific attention here. It is common in empirical economics for one study to generate more 
than one estimate of the parameter of interest. Some authors report just the final equation while 
others also publish intermediate results. Selection of one parameter value per study may be 
misleading and inefficient as additional variation is ignored (Florax (2002)). As is well known, 
including more than one value per study introduces interdependency across the meta sample: 
some group of elasticities may be correlated with another group as they have been estimated on 
the same sample and using the same theoretical specification.    13 
In our case, there may be an additional correlation. If various types of elasticities (e.g. those of 
payroll and income taxes) have been obtained from the same study, then a subset of the meta 
sample of payroll tax elasticities may be correlated with observations on income tax elasticities.  
To keep the analysis tractable, if all specifications within a specific study are estimated 
using the same data set, then I take just one of them. In most cases, I prefer the results that the 
authors regard as ‘best’ (see also Stanley (2001)); in some cases, there is an alternative that 
better meets the goal of the analysis and that cannot be statistically rejected. The possible 
correlation between different types of elasticities obtained from the same wage equation is 
accounted for, however. We will discuss this topic in section 4.3. 
2.4  Towards a suitable wage definition 
All studies in the sample contain at least one wage equation, but there is not much uniformity in 
the definition of the dependent variable. From table 2.1, it follows that wage equations explain 
variations in nominal wage costs, yearly, quarterly, monthly and hourly wages, gross and net 
wages, real and nominal wages. The number of definitions is even larger as the word ‘real’ may 
refer to deflation by consumer prices, output prices or the GDP price index. What is a suitable 
definition to compare wage elasticities?  
Table 2.1  Empirical wage definitions 
Definition  Number of cases 
   
Gross wage per employee  91 
Gross wage costs per employee  27 
Real gross wage per employee  21 
Real gross wage costs per employee  46 
Net wage per employee  37 
Gross hourly wage  1 
Gross hourly wage costs  1 
Real gross hourly wage costs  8 
Real net hourly wage  43 
Real consumer wage  10 
Ratio of real consumer wage and real post tax benefits  2 
Nominal monthly wages  1 
Real monthly wages  7 
Quarterly gross wages per employee  1 
Nominal unit Labour costs  6 
   
Total  296 
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The concept of wage costs is closest to the price of labour paid by the employer. On the other 
hand, if I had started from the definition of labour productivity as the hourly production per 
employee I would use the hourly wage concept. So I should prefer hourly wage costs per 
employee, but this is not a practical definition, however. To convert all other wage concepts 
into hourly wage costs per worker one needs additional data on the payroll tax rate, the number 
of hours worked (which may change from year to year) as well as the amount of extra 
allowances (for overtime work or holidays, for example). This is a time consuming activity. 
Therefore, I have selected the gross yearly wage per employee as a common definition. All 
reported and derived elasticities related to other wage definitions can rather straightforward be 
transformed to elasticities of the gross yearly wage. 
Define the set A as: 
 
{ } u y c m a s q A ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ρ, , , , , , , : 1 1 1 − − +  
 
ε  elasticity of the gross yearly wage per employee 
q  labour productivity 
s  producer payroll tax, elasticity  1 s ε +  
ta  average income tax rate, elasticity 1 a ε −  
tm  marginal income tax rate, elasticity 1 m ε −  
pc  consumer price, elasticity c ε  
py  output price, elasticity y ε  
ρ  net replacement ratio 
u  unemployment rate 
 
A contains all desired elasticities of the gross yearly wage per employee. Now it is 
straightforward to derive the elasticity of wage costs 
p W with respect of the payroll tax rate: 
1
1 1 (1 ) 1
1 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
P
s p
s W s W s s W
s W s s W s W
ε +
+ ∂ + ∂ + + ∂
≡ = + ≡ +
∂ + + ∂ + ∂ +
  (2.1) 
In a similar way elasticities of the real wage and net wage can be transformed into gross wage 
elasticities. In case of elasticities of the wage per hour I assume that extra remunerations above 
the hourly wage rate are proportional to hourly wages. If, in addition the total number of hours 
worked per employee per year y h is independent of the hourly wage then one may write yearly 
gross wage per employee W in terms of the hourly wage rate h W :   15 
(1 )
h
y W W v h = +   (2.2)  
with v the additional payments per hour worked, expressed as share of the hourly wage rate. 
From equation (2.2), it follows that, given our assumptions the labour productivity, elasticities 
of pay based on hourly and yearly wages are similar. Quarterly or monthly wages can be treated 
similarly.  
A number of wage equations include tax variables in a tax wedge Λ and prices in a price 









Λ = Π =
−
  (2.3) 
In these cases the wedge elasticities have been transformed into elasticities of the individual tax 
and price variables. A wage equation that contains wedges is generally more restrictive; 
therefore we will discuss possible consequences for wage elasticities derived from this type of 
equations below.  
2.5  Short and long-term elasticities 
Many reported wage equations obey a dynamic specification that yields both short and long-
term elasticities. In this case, I just take the long-term values, as this is the main scope of the 
analysis. Moreover, in this case short-term elasticities usually depend on (changes in) prices and 
general business indicators only. In some publications, however, all variables are expressed in 
first differences: absolute, relative or in logarithms. The corresponding wage equations yield 
short-term elasticities only. These values are included in the sample, as they usually supply 
information on the desired elasticities. Moreover, they enable test whether ‘average’ short and 
long-term elasticities differ.  
   16   17 
3  Description of the meta samples 
3.1  General characteristics 
Table 3.1 illustrates the distribution of estimated elasticities over countries.  
Table 3.1  Number of elasticities by type and country 
Country  q ε   s + 1 ε   a − 1 ε   m − 1 ε   c ε   y ε   ρ ε   u ε   Total 
                   
Australia  2  2  2  1  5  2  1  4  19 
Austria  5  1  1    2  3    6  18 
Belgium  4  1  2    3  2    5  17 
Bulgaria          1      1  2 
Canada  4  2  3  1  3  3  1  7  24 
Denmark  6  4  1  1  2  5  5  10  34 
Finland  8  21  19  1  18  23  10  13  113 
France  10  5  6  1  9  9  2  14  56 
Germany  14  6  5  1  7  12  2  17  64 
Hungary          1      1  2 
Ireland  3  2  2  1  1  2  1  4  16 
Italy  8  5  6  1  4  7    12  43 
Japan  5  3  2  1  3  3    5  22 
The Netherlands  39  32  36  1  29  32  27  39  235 
New Zealand  0  1  1    1      2  5 
Norway  5  7  5    5  9  5  14  50 
Poland          1      3  4 
Portugal  2        1  1    2  6 
Romania          1      1  2 
Spain  6  5  4  1  5  6  6  10  43 
Sweden  7  8  9  2  7  11  2  14  60 
Switzerland          1      2  3 
UK  10  11  12  2  7  13  8  20  83 
USA  7  6  5  1  6  8  2  12  47 
Country groups   4  6  10  2  6  1  2  5  36 
                   
Nordic countries  26  40  34  4  32  48  22  51  257 
Anglo Saxon countries  26  24  25  6  23  28  13  49  194 
The Netherlands  39  32  36  1  29  32  27  39  235 
Other countries  58  32  36  7  45  44  12  84  318 
                   
Total  149  128  131  18  129  152  74  223  1004 
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Roughly spoken, there are 3 main groups: the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland), Anglo-Saxon countries, and other European countries with Germany, France, the 
Netherlands and Italy as main representatives. A number of elasticities refers to pooled 
estimates for country groups, like Nordic Countries or (a sample of) OECD countries. Estimates 
of the unemployment elasticity of pay are most abundant while the elasticity of the marginal 
retention rate is relatively scarce.  
The number of elasticities corresponding to the Netherlands (235) seems extremely high; it 
must be noted however that 140 of these have been obtained from one publication only: 
Graafland and Verbruggen (1993) estimate on average 7 elasticities for 20 production sectors.  
Table 3.2  Elasticities of pay by type 
  Number  Sample mean  Sample median  Standard error  Minimum  Maximum 
             
Labour productivity (q)  146  0.875  1  0.199  0.250  1.121 
Payroll tax(1+s)  138  – 0.659  – 0.720  0.323  – 1  0 
Average retention ratio (1-ta)  131  – 0.390  – 0.368  0.277  – 1  0.100 
Marginal retention ratio (1-tm)  18  0.226  0.200  0.245  – 0.120  0.650 
Producer price (py)  152  0.725  0.790  0.273  0  1.140 
Consumer price (pc)  129  0.657  0.774  0.363  0  1.090 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  74  0.349  0.322  0.274  0  1.080 
Unemployment rate (u)  223  – 0.089  – 0.064  0.093  – 0.498  0.160 
             
Total  1011           
 
Table 3.2 supplies summary statistics of the meta sample by type of elasticity. Income tax 
variables are expressed as income retention ratio’s (1-ta) and (1-tm) rather than income tax rates. 
Some numbers in the table appear as integers indicating that their values have been fixed a 
priori in the reported equation. In section 4.3, I will consider how the possible impact of these 
econometric restrictions on reported elasticities of pay can be taken into account. 
Figures 3.1 to 3.4 illustrate the distribution of the eight types of elasticities. Numbers at the 
horizontal axes are midmark values. In each diagram, 3 vertical lines have been drawn. The 
central line indicates the mean value of the elasticity; the other two are one standard deviation 
away from the mean value.    19 
Figure 3.1  Elasticities:  labour productivity              payroll tax (1+s) 
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There is a lot of variation in the diagrams: the elasticities of wages with respect to labour 
productivity and the unemployment rate are rather concentrated around their mean values. The 
distributions of the elasticities of tax rates on the other hand tend to be more dispersed. 
In figure 3.1, more than 35% of the labour-productivity elasticities in the sample was a 
priori set at a value of 1. Despite of this, the sample mean is just about 0.86, which implies that 
the mean value of the free estimates is about 0.78. The data do not suggest an unambiguous 
reason for this difference. All relevant studies use time series data; in some cases low values 
correspond to specific countries (Drèze and Bean (1990), Fritsche et al. (2005), Guichard and 
Laffargue (2000)), but the data also indicate that short-run elasticities tend to be somewhat 
smaller in size than long-run values.  
More than 40 payroll tax elasticities have been set to − 1 a priori; most of these correspond 
to wage equations in which the dependent variable is expressed as wage cost per employee 
while the payroll tax does not enter the equation as explanatory variable. Apart from these 
values, the distribution is rather uniform. The sample mean of −0.67 indicates that on average 
33% of a payroll tax increase is borne by the producer; 67% of the burden is shifted on to the 
employee. It is reasonable to assume that this process takes some time to settle; hence the short-
run elasticity may differ from the long-run value. Furthermore, 41 out of 128 elasticities were 
computed from tax wedge elasticities; the sample mean of these restricted estimates is about 
−0.60, which implies that the mean of the unrestricted elasticities is about −0.72. The deviation 
from the sample mean (− 0.05) is not that large (some 40% of the standard error) but it may be 
significant.   20 
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Figure 3.2 shows that the values of the elasticity of the average retention rate are roughly 
between −0.7 and −0.1. Like in case of payroll taxes, we expect short and long-run values of the 
elasticity to differ. The direction of the adjustment process will be opposite, however: the 
impact on the long run will be smaller (in absolute value) than the sort-term elasticity. The 
sample mean of the 41 values extracted from price wedge estimates is virtually the same as the 
overall sample mean of −0.39. Therefore in this case I expect that the impact of the restrictions 
is small and insignificant.  
The sample of marginal retention rate elasticities contains 18 observations only, of which 10 
were obtained from Tyrväinen (1995b); 5 of these were put to zero after a statistical test. 
Another 4 elasticities are in the range 0.5 - 0.6, while the pooled estimation of Brunello and 
Sonedda (2007) yields very small values (around zero). It remains to be seen whether any 
conclusions can be drawn from the regressions. 
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Figure 3.3 displays the price elasticities of the wage rate. Many publications estimate real wage 
equations; in these cases the output price or the consumer price is used as deflator. If the price 
variable does not enter the right hand side of the equation the corresponding wage elasticity is 1 
by assumption. In case of py 54 elasticities are fixed to 1 by applying py as wage deflator; 25 
values of the consumer price elasticity are set to 1. Restrictions also play a crucial role here: 26 
producer price elasticities and 27 consumer price wage elasticities were obtained from 
regressions that include a price wedge or a combined price wedge and tax wedge.    21 
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Most observations on the net replacement ratio elasticity of wages are in the range 0.0 - 0.5. 
There is an important peak between 0 and 0.1, and roughly the same number of elasticities is 
greater than 0.4. What is the reason of this dispersion? One possible explanation is the 
difference across countries in the generosity of the welfare state. In countries where the levels 
of benefits (and hence, net replacement ratio’s) are relatively high, the unemployed have less 
incentives to easily accept a job and a rise in the replacement ratio requires an increase in the 
wage rate to encourage search efforts of unemployed workers. If that were true, one would 
expect a significant impact of country dummies in the meta regression. A second explanation 
may be the difference in outside options between the sectoral and the aggregate replacement 
ratio. The latter is often called benefit replacement ratio: the alternative wage corresponds to a 
situation that a person is unemployed and dependent on welfare or unemployment benefits. In a 
sectoral wage equation, the alternative wage is often the average wage in the rest of the 
economy. In this case the replacement ratio is a measure of the relative attractiveness of other 
production sectors. So we may expect a higher sensitiveness of sectoral wages to changes in the 
replacement ratio.  
Finally, let’s inspect the values of the unemployment elasticity of pay. Almost 85% of the 
elasticities differs less than one standard error from the sample mean. This sample mean is close 
to the results reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), Nijkamp and Poot (2005) and Clar 
et al. (2007). This is remarkable, as most of our estimates have been obtained from long-run 
macro or sectoral wage equations while the well known wage curve relates real individual 
earnings to local labour market conditions. Does this support the ‘empirical law of economics’ 
hypothesis (Card (1995))? We will explore this below. 
3.2  Expectations from economic theory 
What do we expect from the meta-analysis? In the long run, improvements in labour 
productivity will be reflected in higher wages. Producers will try to shift the burden of 
increasing wages to the consumer. This may be a problem to firms operating in highly   22 
competitive markets. The long-run macro elasticity of labour productivity however, may 
expected to be close to 1. 
As to tax elasticities, producers will partly shift the burden of higher payroll taxes to the 
employees through lower wage offers. Trade unions however, may aim to compensate 
employees for increased income taxes through higher wage claims. If the impact on wages does 
not depend on which side of the market is taxed, then we may expect the wage elasticities of 
payroll taxes and income taxes to sum up to -1. In that case the real after tax wage is affected 
through changes in the tax wedge only.  
Consumer prices are related to output prices. If both are included in a wage equation, the 
impact of prices on the real wage is often captured through the price wedge only. In that case 
the price elasticities of the nominal wage should add up to 1. 
A higher net replacement ratio will decrease the search effort of the unemployed. In that 
case it takes more time to fulfil existing vacancies and the employer has to offer higher wages 
to stimulate the unemployed to accept a job offer. This impact on wages may depend on the 
type of the welfare state. In relatively generous welfare states the replacement ratio elasticity of 
the wage may be higher than in Anglo Saxon countries.  
A final point to note is that the unemployment elasticity of pay may depend on the level of 
the net replacement ratio and vice versa (Graafland and Huizinga (1999), Peeters and den Reijer 
(2001, 2002), Kranendonk and Verbruggen (2006)). If unemployment is low, spells of 
unemployment are only short and changes in the net replacement ratio will have only a small 
impact on wages. On the other hand, the influence of the unemployment rate on wages may 
diminish with the level of the replacement ratio. It may be close to zero if the replacement ratio 
equals one. 
To sum up, we have formulated 5 hypotheses on the long-run macro elasticities of the 
nominal wage: 
 
1.  The long-run labour productivity elasticity is close to 1. 
2.  The tax elasticities add up to minus 1. 
3.  The price elasticities add up to 1. 
4.  The size of the net replacement ratio elasticity is higher in more generous welfare 
states. 
5.  The unemployment elasticity of pay depends on the level of the net replacement ratio 
and vice versa. 
 
Note that these hypotheses are formulated in terms of elasticities. As the meta results do not 
allow to compute appropriate test statistics, we are not able to formally test them. Therefore the 
hypotheses will be used to perform a sensitivity analysis in section 5.4. The 4
th and 5
th 
hypothesis are directly linked to the estimation results; hence they may be tested.    23 
4  Specification and dummy selection 
4.1  Specification of the meta equations 
The meta sample consists of 8 series: one for each elasticity of pay. All vectors of elasticities 
i ε i=1,...,8 have a common length equal to the number of included wage equations. This has the 
advantage that the k-th component of all vectors i ε corresponds to the same wage equation. The 
variation within each vector i ε is explained by a vector of general constants αi0 and a set of 
dummy vectors dj (value 0 or 1). Before discussing the estimation method, I first introduce the 
various dummy types.  
4.2  General dummies 
Table 4.1 summarizes dummy variables. Some need a short explanation. 
Table 4.1  Overview of dummy variables 
Dummy variable  Condition value =1 
   
Country dummy the Netherlands  The Netherlands 
Dummy Anglo Saxon countries  UK,USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
Dummy Nordic countries  Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
Publication dummy  Publication in peer reviewed journal 
Time series dummy  Based on time series data 
OLS dummy  Use of single equation estimation technique 
Bargaining dummy  Specification based on wage bargaining model 
Union density  If included in source equation 
First difference estimation  All variables in source equation in first differences 
Dummy level estimation  Source equation formulated in level variables only 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag dummy  Source equation estimated in ADL format 
Sector dummy  Sectoral wage equations 
Time dummy 50-69  If mid sample year in period 1950 - 1969 
Time dummy 90-08  If mid sample year in period 1990 - 2008 
 
Wage bargaining and union density 
Economic theory suggests that wage equations derived from or based on a theoretical wage 
bargaining model may differ from equations in other types of models (see section 2.1). To 
account for possible differences in estimated coefficients the bargaining dummy has a value of 
1 only if the equation is related to a wage bargaining model. I also use the union density 
dummy: it indicates whether a specific elasticity has been obtained from an equation that 
includes union density as an explanatory variable, or not. Union density serves as a measure for 
bargaining power; it is defined as the number of union members relative tot the total number of 
employees.   24 
Publication dummy 
The analysis does not permit to test or correct for possible selection bias (Card and Krueger 
(1995)), as standard errors of elasticities are often not available. Yet it may be useful to make a 
distinction between peer reviewed articles and working or conference papers. 
Economic specification 
It is well known that estimates obtained from time series data generally differ from the results 
from panel or cross section analysis; hence the use of the times series dummy. Another 
empirical observation is that many wage equations are not stand alone: a price, a tax or an 
employment equation may have been estimated simultaneously. Therefore, an OLS dummy 
captures differences between coefficients estimated from single equations and the results from 
the use of simultaneous techniques. 
A third point to note is that the dynamic specification of the wage equation determines the 
estimates of the elasticities. This can be taken into account by introducing three dummies. The 
first marks wage equations in which all variables are in first differences; they yield short-run 
elasticities only. The second type (level estimation) indicates that the equation does not account 
for any dynamics: just current levels matter. Finally, the third dummy relates to estimates 
obtained from autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) equations. The latter contain both 
endogenous and exogenous variables in levels and differences. Error correction models are a 
particular case of this type. By definition the 3 dummies are interrelated: their sum equals 1. 
Therefore only two of them should be included; as on average some 70% of the elasticities has 
been obtained from an ADL equation, this will be the reference case. Hence I will use the first 
difference dummy and the level estimation dummy.  
Non-linearities 
The 5th hypothesis in section 4.2 can be tested by adding the corresponding sample average of 
the unemployment rate (u )in the meta regression for the elasticity of the replacement ratio and 
vice versa.  
4.3  Restriction dummies 
The overview of table 3 is not complete. I want to address the problem of possible 
interdependency of elasticities obtained from the same wage equation (see section 2.3). Figure 
4.1 illustrates the problem. The figure classifies the estimated wage equations by number of 
included elasticities from the set  { } u y c m a s q A ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ρ, , , , , , , : 1 1 1 − − + . Almost 25% of all 
equations include at most 2 of the desired elasticities, but only 2 wage equations include all. 
Does this (in)completeness have an impact on estimated elasticities? And second, if so, does it 
matter whether relevant coefficients have been estimated under restrictions?  
   25 





























To answer these questions, I introduce 3 dummies for each observed element of the vectors  i ε . 
Recall that all corresponding elements of the vectors  i ε , i=1,..8 correspond to the same wage 
equation. The first dummy, Fij answers the question: does the wage equation from which we 
obtain elasticity of type i also yield a free estimate of elasticity type j? The second dummy, Rij 
indicates whether this possible coefficient of elasticity j was estimated under an equality 
restriction. For example, an equation that contains a tax wedge imposes that  s + 1 ε and a − 1 ε are 
equal in absolute value. Finally, the dummy Cij equals 1 if  i ε has been obtained from a wage 
equation in which the value of  j ε was fixed. By definition, if  i ε is observed, then 
1 = + + ii ii ii C R F . In this case I do not include Fii: a free estimate is the reference case. 
4.4  Estimation: specification and technique 
Using the dummies discussed above, the empirical equation for elasticity i ε can be written as: 
13 8 8 8
0
1 1, 1 1
i i ij j ik ik ik ik ik ik i i i i i
j k k i k k
d F R C u v i A ε α α β γ δ λ ρ µ
= = ≠ = =
= + + + + + + + ∈ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   (4.1) 
The equation of , i i A ε ε ∈ contains a constant, 13 dummy vectors dj (see table 3), 7 dummy 
vectors Fij, 8 dummy vectors Rij and 8 vectors Cij . Here, i u is the mean of the unemployment 
rate in case the replacement ratio elasticity of pay is observed and zero else. Similarly,  i ρ is the 
average replacement ratio in the sample where u ε is observed and zero else. The elements of the 
vector of error terms vi are identically and independently distributed.    26 
I have estimated equation (4.1) for all relevant elasticities, applying the Least Absolute 
Deviation (LAD) method. As Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) argue, its application yields a 
considerable gain in robustness compared to Least Squares estimates, as the estimator is less 
sensible to outliers in the dependent variable. Asymptotic standard errors have been computed 
using a Huber Sandwich method (see e.g. Freedman (2006)). Details can be found in Folmer 
(2009). 
To obtain a benchmark value for each wage elasticity, we may apply equation (4.1) with all 
parameters replaced by their estimated values. Of course, we also have to consider the preferred 
values of the dummy variables. Should they be set at 0 or 1 or is it better to take a sample 
mean? I will return to this point in section 5.2. In section 5.3, I will also present benchmark 
values obtained from OLS regressions.    27 
5  Results and applications 
5.1  Estimation results 
This section presents a global overview of the results. To prevent spurious correlations, 
dummies that only have nonzero values in less than 10% of the sample have been excluded 
from the regression. A detailed description can be found in Folmer (2009), appendix C.  
Section 5.2 computes benchmark values for all types of elasticities using estimated coefficients 
and specific values of dummy variables. Section 5.3 explores the possibility to compute 
benchmark elasticities for wage equations that contain a wedge variable. Finally, section 5.4 
discusses the robustness of the benchmark elasticities. 
Table 5.1 summarizes regression results. The table displays the signs of the estimated 
coefficients. Coefficients with p-values above 0.10 have been single marked, if the p-values are 
smaller than 0.10, then double marks have been used. The 2 R statistic reported is a 
pseudo 2 R (Koenker and Machado, 1999). In case of the elasticity of the marginal income 
retention ratio m t − 1 the sample size limits the number of dummies in the regression. Therefore, 
in this case only the country dummies have been included.  
Table 5.1  Elasticities of pay: signs of coefficients and general statistics  
                Elasticity of pay corresponding to: 
  q  1+s  1-ta  1-tm  pc  py  ρ  u 
                 
Constant  ++  –   −   +  ++  ++  –   –  
The Netherlands dummy  –   –   +  +  +  –   +  –  
Anglo Saxon dummy  +  +  –   +  –   +  –   ++ 
Dummy Nordic countries  +  –   −   +  –   +  –   –  
Publication dummy  +  +  – –     +  –   +  –  
Time series dummy    –   –     –   –   ++  –  
Hourly wage dummy  +  –   +     ++  –   +  + 
Single equation estimator  +  –   +    +  +  –   + 
Bargaining dummy  –   –   –     +  –   +  + 
Union density    –         –      
First difference estimation  –   ++  –     +  –      
Level estimation  +  –   +    –   –   –   –  
Sector dummy  +  +  +     +  –   +  + 
Time dummy 1990-2008            –     + 
Volume unemployment rate              +   
Pseudo  2 R   0.169  0.413  0.169  – 0.008  0.304  0.607  0.119  0.021 
Mean value  0.875  – 0.659  – 0.390  0.226  0.725  0.657  0.349  – 0.089 
Observations  146  138  131  18  129  152  74  223 
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Table 5.2 summarizes the impact of the restriction dummies F, R and C on the estimated 
elasticities. Symbols refer to the type of dummy that embodies the relationship. To gain a clear 
view we have restricted the possible impact to dummies that show coefficients with p-values < 
0.1. For example, the row indicating elasticities of the payroll tax (1+s) shows that elasticities 
differ if the payroll tax elasticity is fixed a priori (C dummy equals 1) and if the elasticity of the 
consumer price is included through a wedge variable (R = 1). 
Table 5.2  Elasticities of pay: signs of coefficients and general statistics  
Elasticity of pay               Depends on inclusion of 
  q  1+s  1-ta  1-tm  pc  py  ρ  u 
                 
Labour productivity (q)                 
Payroll taxes (1+s)    C      R       
Average retention rate (1-ta)                 
Marginal retention rate (1-tm)                 
Consumer price (pc)      R      F    F 
Producer price (py)  FC        FR  RC    F 
Replacement ratio (ρ)    R             
Unemployment rate (u)    C             
 
From the overall regression results the following conclusions emerge: 
Labour productivity 
The size of the general constant is about 80% of the sample mean and its standard error is small. 
Country dummies hardly have any impact. The size of the C dummy of labour productivity 
indicates that wage equations that estimate this elasticity yield on average lower values than if it 
is fixed a priori (in this case: at a value of 1). 
Payroll taxes 
The results indicate a substantial difference between short and long-term elasticities. Price 
variables matter especially. If the wage equation contains a price wedge, then this yields smaller 
elasticities (in absolute value). The C dummies of the payroll tax and both price variables 
indicate that equations formulated in terms of wage costs or real wages deflated by the producer 
price index result in higher elasticities (in absolute value). Deflation of wages using the 
consumer price index decreases the absolute size of the payroll tax elasticity. 
Average income retention rate 
The overall results are similar to those of the payroll tax elasticity: long-term elasticities differ 
from short-term. Wage equations estimated in levels only (without any dynamics) yield 
substantially higher (i.c. less negative) elasticities.    29 
Marginal income retention rate 
In this case, the sample consists of 18 observations only. The results indicate that the sample 
mean (or median) is possibly the best estimate of the elasticity 
Consumer prices 
The use of single equation estimation methods produces higher elasticities. The inclusion of the 
output price has a significant negative impact, which is consistent with the results on the 
elasticity of py (see below).  
Output prices 
Elasticities based on sector analysis are lower than their macro equivalents. The results also 
suggest the output price elasticity of the wage rate is substantially lower if the consumer price is 
included in the wage equation, either through a freely estimated parameter or a price wedge. We 
may conclude that if one of the prices py or pc is omitted from the wage equation, the elasticity 
of the remaining price is pushed upwards. 
Net replacement ratio 
The sector dummy has a positive impact: the elasticity is higher than may be expected on basis 
of pure macroeconomic data. The 5th formulated in section 3.2 that the elasticity depends on 
the level of the unemployment rate finds some support: the estimated coefficient has the right 
(positive) sign, but standard errors are relatively high. Just like in case of both tax elasticities of 
pay, entering tax variables through a wedge variable matters, but here the net impact is very 
modest. 
Unemployment rate 
The coefficient of the level of the replacement ratio ( i λ in equation (8)) doesn’t have the 
expected sign: a higher replacement ratio increases the absolute value of the unemployment 
elasticity of pay. Therefore, the level of unemployment has been omitted from the final 
regression. The Anglo Saxon dummy is negative; its size (− 0.04) does not change if the 
equation is estimated by OLS rather than LAD. In the OLS regressions, its t-value is slightly 
above 2.0. The C dummy of the payroll tax indicates that equations that explain wage costs (in 
that case the C dummy equals 1) yield higher unemployment elasticities of pay in absolute 
value than equations that explain gross wages.  
 
An obvious result from the meta regressions is that the output price elasticity of pay depends on 
the inclusion of the consumer price in the wage equation and vice versa. Both prices also have 
an important impact on tax elasticities. The producer taxes and output prices are the main 
determinants of wage elasticities.   30 
5.2  Benchmark values 
Suppose we have derived a wage equation from some theoretical concept and we want to 
quantify the related wage elasticities. How can we apply the results of the meta analysis? First, 
the results do not serve the rejection of a specific wage equation in favour of another. For 
example, we cannot judge of elasticities obtained from fixed, restricted or freely estimated 
parameters. Second, the theoretical specification of the wage equation determines the optimal 
values of the dummy variables. 
The benchmark values supplied below merely serve as an illustration of this point. Let’s 
assume that our derived wage equation is log linear in its arguments. Then we may set the 
corresponding dummy values as reported in table 5.3. As can be seen, the F, R and C dummies 
have been fixed at their sample means. This implies that information of all types of wage 
equations is used: whether coefficients have been estimated free, restricted or fixed.  
Table 5.3  Settings of dummy variables 
Dummy variable  Preferred value 
   
Publication dummy  Sample mean 
Time series dummy  1 
Single equation estimation dummy  0 
Bargaining dummy  1 
Union density  0 
First difference dummy  0 (long run) or 1 (short run) 
Dummy level estimation  0 (short run) or sample mean (long run) 
Sector dummy  0 (macro) or 1 (aggregate) 
Time dummy 1950-1969  0 
Time dummy 1990-2008  1 
F, R and C dummies of pc and py , elasticities  u y c ε ε ε , ,   Sample mean in common sample of pc and py  
F, R and C dummies, all other cases  Sample mean in full sample 
 
The discussion above on wage elasticities of prices suggests that wage equations that just 
contain either of the two prices may yield biased elasticities for the remaining one. Therefore, to 
compute benchmark values for c ε and y ε we will use only results of wage equations that contain 
both price variables. Therefore the sample means of the restriction dummies of pc and py in the 
common sample of both elasticities will be used.  
Benchmark values show up in table 5.4 by country group, and short and long-term 
elasticities. Wage elasticities of 1+s, 1-ta and 1-tm can be converted to elasticities of tax rates s, 
ta and tm .This requires country specific data however on average producer and income tax rates 
(s and ta) and the marginal income tax rate tm. Hence, estimated elasticities will also depend on 
the particular values chosen for these exogenous variables. Country specific elasticities are 
close to the sample means (see table 3.2). In all cases, long-run elasticities for labour 
productivity are smaller than one. A possible explanation of the relatively low values for the   31 
Netherlands is that on average 50% of the elasticities of labour productivity originates from 
sectoral wage equations, while this share is just 20% on average for all other countries.  
Table 5.4  Long- and short-term elasticities of the gross wage by type and country group 
elasticity   The Netherlands   Anglo-Saxon  
 countries 
 Nordic Countries   Other Countries 
  long term  short term  long term  short term  long term  short term  long term  short term 
                 
Labour productivity   0.830  0.812  0.919  0.901  0.919  0.901  0.919  0.901 
Payroll tax (1+rate)  − 0.785  − 0.392  − 0.726  − 0.333  − 0.756  − 0.363  − 0.736  − 0.342 




































Consumer price  0.536  0.577  0.532  0.573  0.472  0.513  0.532  0.573 
Producer price  0.393  0.334  0.450  0.391  0.549  0.490  0.450  0.391 
Net replacement ratio  0.400  0.400  0.260  0.260  0.238  0.138  0.297  0.297 
Unemployment rate  − 0.083  − 0.083  − 0.046  − 0.046  − 0.094  − 0.094  − 0.082  − 0.082 
 
Long- and short-term values of estimated tax elasticities substantially differ. In the short run, 
36% of an increase of producer payroll taxes is borne by employees; in the long run this 
amounts to 75%. If real wages are sticky in the short run, producers adjust wage offers in later 
periods to shift the larger part of a past increase in payroll taxes to the employee. The opposite 
effect occurs in case of the average income retention ratio: the instantaneous impact (0.42) is 
about 60% higher than the long-run impact (0.25). If nominal wages are fixed in the short run, 
an increase in income taxes is to a large extent borne by the employees. In future wage 
negotiations, employees (or unions) succeed in partially compensating the increase in income 
tax through higher wages. Note that the sum of the average long-run elasticities of the payroll 
tax (0.75) and the average income retention ration (0.25) is close to 1, which is in line with 
hypothesis 2 in section 3.2. This also implies that in the long run 25% of an increase in payroll 
or income taxes is borne by the producer and 75% by the employee. 
The elasticities of the marginal retention ratio are all around the sample mean of 0.25, 
except in case of other countries, where it is close to zero. Maybe the latter is due to the small 
sample size.  
The sum of the two long-run price elasticities is rather close to 1. This is what we expected 
in hypothesis 3. If we use the average value of the corresponding restriction dummies in the 
complete meta sample then the sum of both elasticities would be about 1.5. If either of the two 
prices is used to deflate wages (in that case the C dummy equals 1) or if the wage equation 
contains a price wedge (R dummies are equal to 1) then different benchmark values may result.  
The size of the Anglo Saxon unemployment elasticities of pay is about 50% lower than in 
case of all other countries. A reason may be that the Anglo Saxon type of welfare state is less 
generous (Esping Andersen (1990)). The lower the real unemployment benefits, the stronger the   32 
incentive to look for a new job in case of unemployment and the lower the reservation wage. So 
an additional rise in unemployment may have a lesser impact on search intensity and wages 
than in more generous welfare states like those of Nordic countries and the Netherlands. 
5.3  Sensitivity analysis 
So far LAD regression results ere used to obtain benchmark wage elasticities. This section 
compares benchmark values that have been obtained using alternative estimation techniques. 
The first alternative uses restricted LAD estimates. A number of coefficients has large standard 
errors and high p-values. If the size of the parameter in the LAD regressions is small and 
computed standard errors are large then I have imposed zero restrictions on the estimated 
coefficients. To test the restrictions I applied a Quasi Likelihood Ratio (QLR) test, which is 
asymptotically χ
2(k) distributed with k the number of restrictions imposed by the null hypothesis 
(Koenker and Basset (1982)). I have also estimated all meta equations using OLS rather than 
LAD.  
Possible correlations between elasticities obtained from the same wage equation have been 
taken into account through the restriction dummies F, R and C. The results in table 5.2 suggest 
that wage elasticities of price and tax variables may be mutually dependent and the same holds 
for elasticities of prices and unemployment. To further investigate this I have estimated all 
elasticities in the subsets{ } y c a s ε ε ε ε , , , 1 1 − +  and { } y c u ε ε ε , ,  using common observations 
only. The first subsystem contains 63 common observations, the second system includes 48.   
Tables 5.5 - 5.8 compare long-term macro elasticities obtained from various estimation 
techniques by country group.  
Tax elasticities seem not very sensitive to the estimation method: the difference between short 
and long-term values emerges from all regressions. The sum of the long-term elasticities of 1+s 
and 1-ta is still close to 1. Short-term elasticities of the average retention rate tend to be higher 
in least squares regressions, however.  
Although the sum of the wage elasticities of pc and py is fairly stable, in the system 
regressions the elasticity of the consumer price tends to increase, leading to low values of  y ε , 
especially in case of the Nordic countries. Benchmark elasticities of the unemployment 
elasticity of pay obtained from the system regressions confirm the earlier conclusions that the 
size of the elasticity in Anglo Saxon countries is roughly half that of other country groups.   33 
Table 5.5  Long and short-term macro gross wage elasticities 
The Netherlands                 
            LAD          LAD restricted            OLS            System 1 LS            System 2 LS 
Variable  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST 
                     
q  0.830  0.812  0.838  0.838  0.811  0.712         
1+s  – 0.777  – 0.384  – 0.724  – 0.329  – 0.753  – 0.273  – 0.743  – 0.326     
1-ta  – 0.185  – 0.357  – 0.255  – 0.334  – 0.280  – 0.452  – 0.235  – 0.522     
1-tm  0.272  0.272        0.272  0.272         
pc  0.414  0.455  0.485  0.485  0.422  0.434  0.451  0.485  0.554  0.554 
py  0.415  0.356  0.465  0.404  0.505  0.328  0.380  0.364  0.357  0.357 
ρ  0.250  0.250  0.400  0.400  0.346  0.346         
u  – 0.087  – 0.087  – 0.093  – 0.093  – 0.130  – 0.130      – 0.099  – 0.099 
 
Table 5.6  Long and short-term macro gross wage elasticities 
Anglo-Saxon countries                 
            LAD    LAD restricted            OLS            System 1 LS            System 2 LS 
Variable  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST 
                     
q  0.830  0.812  0.838  0.838  0.811  0.712         
1+s  – 0.777  – 0.384  – 0.724  – 0.329  – 0.753  – 0.273  – 0.743  – 0.326     
1-ta  – 0.185  – 0.357  – 0.255  – 0.334  – 0.280  – 0.452  – 0.235  – 0.522     
1-tm  0.272  0.272        0.272  0.272         
pc  0.414  0.455  0.485  0.485  0.422  0.434  0.451  0.485  0.554  0.554 
py  0.415  0.356  0.465  0.404  0.505  0.328  0.380  0.364  0.357  0.357 
ρ  0.250  0.250  0.400  0.400  0.346  0.346         
u  – 0.087  – 0.087  – 0.093  – 0.093  – 0.130  – 0.130      – 0.099  – 0.099 
 
Table 5.7  Long and short-term macro gross wage elasticities 
Nordic countries                 
            LAD    LAD restricted            OLS           System 1 LS            System 2 LS 
Variable  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST 
                     
q  0.830  0.812  0.838  0.838  0.811  0.712         
1+s  – 0.777  – 0.384  – 0.724  – 0.329  – 0.753  – 0.273  – 0.743  – 0.326     
1-ta  – 0.185  – 0.357  – 0.255  – 0.334  – 0.280  – 0.452  – 0.235  – 0.522     
1-tm  0.272  0.272        0.272  0.272         
pc  0.414  0.455  0.485  0.485  0.422  0.434  0.451  0.485  0.554  0.554 
py  0.415  0.356  0.465  0.404  0.505  0.328  0.380  0.364  0.357  0.357 
ρ  0.250  0.250  0.400  0.400  0.346  0.346         
u  – 0.087  – 0.087  – 0.093  – 0.093  – 0.130  – 0.130      – 0.099  – 0.099 
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Table 5.8  Long and short-term macro gross wage elasticities 
Other countries                 
            LAD  LAD restricted            OLS            System 1 LS            System 2 LS 
Variable  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST  LT  ST 
                     
q  0.830  0.812  0.838  0.838  0.811  0.712         
1+s  – 0.777  – 0.384  – 0.724  – 0.329  – 0.753  – 0.273  – 0.743  – 0.326     
1-ta  – 0.185  – 0.357  – 0.255  – 0.334  – 0.280  – 0.452  – 0.235  – 0.522     
1-tm  0.272  0.272        0.272  0.272         
pc  0.414  0.455  0.485  0.485  0.422  0.434  0.451  0.485  0.554  0.554 
py  0.415  0.356  0.465  0.404  0.505  0.328  0.380  0.364  0.357  0.357 
ρ  0.250  0.250  0.400  0.400  0.346  0.346         
u  – 0.087  – 0.087  – 0.093  – 0.093  – 0.130  – 0.130      – 0.099  – 0.099 
 
5.4  Restricted estimates 
In this section, we will compute benchmark values for all elasticities imposing hypotheses 1 and 
3. First, we impose that the wage elasticity of labour productivity equals 1. In the second step 
we also require that the elasticities of output and consumer prices add up to 1.  
To compute benchmark values if  1 = q ε  requires that the C dummy of labour productivity 
equals 1 and the corresponding F and R dummies are zero. A value of 1 for the C dummy of 
productivity only indicates that the elasticity of the labour productivity is fixed, without 
specifying a particular value. In the meta sample the value always equals 1 in this case. Table 
5.9 displays the results for benchmark values of the macro wage elasticities if  1 = q ε .  
Table 5.9  Benchmark values of macro wage elasticities if  , 1 = q ε long and short term  
  The Netherlands  Anglo Saxon countries  Nordic countries       Other countries 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0.910  0.892  0.999  0.981  0.999  0.981  0.999  0.981 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.716  – 0.323  – 0.657  – 0.264  – 0.688  – 0.294  – 0.667  – 0.274 
Average income tax (1-ta)  – 0.329  – 0.502  – 0.411  – 0.584  – 0.403  – 0.576  – 0.407  – 0.580 
Marginal income tax (1-tm)  0.272  0.272  0.200  0.200  0.246  0.246  0.011  0.011 
Consumer price (pc)  0.534  0.575  0.530  0.571  0.470  0.511  0.530  0.571 
Producer price (py)  0.465  0.405  0.521  0.462  0.620  0.561  0.521  0.462 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.525  0.525  0.384  0.384  0.362  0.362  0.421  0.421 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.090  – 0.090  – 0.052  – 0.052  – 0.100  – 0.100  – 0.089  – 0.089 
 
The first row shows that the restriction 1 = q ε is not exactly reproduced in case of the 
Netherlands. As we will se below (table 5.10), the sample mean of the C dummy of labour 
productivity is just above 0.2; nevertheless the extrapolation towards a value of 1 is quite good. 
Second, other elasticities also change, but not that much. The sum of both price elasticities is 
for all countries in the range 1.0 - 1.1, which is slightly higher than reported in tables 6.5 - 6.8. 
It is still reasonable to impose our second restriction that this sum equals 1.    35 
Suppose we have concluded from a theoretical model or a literature review that our preferred 
wage equation is log linear in its arguments. Then, if we impose the restrictions 1 = q ε and 
1 = + y c ε ε , we may rewrite this equation as: 
u
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  (5.1) 
Note that, given that the log linear specification is the true model, elasticities in equation (5.1) 
refer to real wages. In this case the restrictions imply that the impact of prices on the real wage 
is fully captured by the price wedge; the implicit assumption is that the output price is 
independent of the right hand side variables in equation (5.1) and on wages.  
Table 5.10 summarizes all restrictions on moderator values that are implied by equation 
(5.2). The sample mean of each dummy, given that elasticity i is observed differs from the mean 
value in case we observe elasticity j. The weighted sample mean is computed using the number 
of observations on each elasticity as weight. The table shows that restricted dummy values may 
substantially differ from the full sample means. Table 5.11 displays the resulting benchmark 
elasticities. 
Table 5.10  Dummy restrictions corresponding to equation (5.2) 
Wage elasticity  Dummy type  Range of sample means  Weighted sample mean  Restricted value 
         
Labour productivity  F  0.3 - 0.7  0.430  0 
Labour productivity  R  0.0  0.000  0 
Labour productivity  C  0.1 - 0.3  0.228  1 
Consumer price  F  0.3 - 0.6  0.473  0 
Consumer price  R  0.0 - 0.7  0.244  1 
Consumer price  C  0.0 - 0.1  0.037  0 
Output price  F  0.3 - 0.7  0.543  0 
Output price  R  0.1 - 0.7  0.230  1 
Output price  C  0.0 - 0.4  0.111  0 
 
Table 5.11  Benchmark values of macro real wage elasticities in equation (6.2), long and short term  
  The Netherlands  Anglo Saxon countries  Nordic countries       Other countries 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0.842  0.824  0.931  0.913  0.931  0.913  0.931  0.913 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.522  – 0.129  – 0.463  – 0.070  – 0.493  – 0.100  – 0.473  – 0.079 
Average income tax (1-ta)  – 0.419  – 0.592  – 0.501  – 0.674  – 0.493  – 0.666  – 0.497  – 0.670 
Marginal income tax (1-tm)  0.272  0.272  0.200  0.200  0.246  0.246  0.011  0.011 
Consumer price (pc)  0.398  0.439  0.394  0.435  0.334  0.375  0.394  0.435 
Producer price (py)  0.554  0.495  0.611  0.552  0.709  0.650  0.611  0.552 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.115  0.115  – 0.025  – 0.025  – 0.047  – 0.047  0.012  0.012 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.133  – 0.133  – 0.095  – 0.095  – 0.143  – 0.143  – 0.131  – 0.131   36 
Compared to earlier results, a number of things have changed: 
 
1.  The elasticity of labour productivity is lower than before, but still close to 1 for most countries; 
2.  The sum of the wage elasticities of pc and py is about 1.0, except for the Netherlands (= 0.95). 
3.  Elasticities of the average income retention rate (1-ta) have increased in size, both in the long 
and the short run; 
4.  Payroll tax elasticities are substantially smaller in absolute value; − 0.38 in the long run and 
slightly positive in the short run. 
5.  Unemployment elasticities of pay almost double in size; 
6.  The elasticity of the replacement rate falls down to almost zero or becomes even negative. 
 
The earlier outcomes of table 5.4 virtually obey the restrictions imposed; why do the results of 
table 5.11 differ so much? The first reason is that output prices and wages may be mutually 
dependent: in this case real wage elasticities differ from nominal wage elasticities. Second, 
from table 5.10 it follows that the number of restrictions on dummies (:9) is relatively high; in 
this case our extrapolations may lose accuracy. Finally, our sample is not balanced: the number 
of observations differs across elasticities and some wage equations are more ‘complete’ than 
others; see figure 4.1. In other words: the thickness of the ice is not uniform: if we impose too 
many restrictions we move away from the safe place and get in thin ice. This may explain the 
unexpected values for the replacement rate elasticity: the number replacement elasticities 
obtained from a real wage equation that contains a price wedge is only 2.   
Some preliminary conclusions may be drawn: 
 
1.  Elasticities of nominal and real wages generally differ, notably with respect to taxes, net 
replacement rates and the unemployment rate; 
2.  Price elasticities based on nominal and real wage equations are roughly the same. If the sum of 
both price elasticities of the nominal wage is close to one, it may not be bad to assume that this 
will also hold in case of price elasticities of the real wage; 
3.  The elasticity of producer taxes is highly sensitive to the deflation of wages. A possible 
explanation is that output prices react on changes in producer taxes. In this case we may write 
the total payroll tax elasticity E1+s as: 
1 1 1
1 1 1
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  (5.2) 
The total payroll tax elasticity of wages s E + 1 equals the partial elasticity s + 1 ε plus the product of 
the output price elasticity of wages y ε and the payroll tax elasticity of the output price s + 1 ω . If 
we assume that the latter is positive, it follows that | | | | 1 1 s s E + + < ε .   37 
4.  The unemployment elasticity of pay is more than doubled. Inspection of the sample shows that 
only 19 out of 223 observations of the unemployment elasticity of pay refer to wage equations 
that contain a price wedge. Therefore not much value should be attached to the reported 
unemployment elasticity in table 5.11. 
 
The tax wedge and Dalton’s law 
A number of authors (Layard et al (1991), Bean et al (1986)) argue that the key variable that 
explains the distortion of labour taxes on wage formation is the tax wedge. This is in line with 
the “most basic theorem of public finance” (Blinder(1988)) that if a tax is levied in a perfect 
competitive market (with fixed labour supply) it does not matter who pays the tax on labour: it 
is the gap between payroll and employee taxes that matters. This result is known as Dalton’s 
law (Muysken et al (1999). The law implies that a neutral shift from producer payroll taxes to 
income tax has no impact on employment and wages.  
This neutral shift can be defined in two ways (Goerke (2000)). When the shift leaves total 
tax revenue unchanged, the law does not hold if the shift affects the structure of the tax system, 
e.g. when the tax bases are unequal due to income tax allowances (Koskela and Schöb (1999)). 
An alternative tax shift leaves the tax wedge unchanged. Goerke (2000) uses this definition to 
apply Dalton’s law to social security taxes. He argues that if labour supply depends on the 
alternative income (e.g. an unemployment benefit), the wedge neutral tax shift will lower the 
net replacement ratio if unemployment benefits are also subject to social security taxes. Do the 
meta results add something to this discussion? 
From section 5.3, it follows that an increase in payroll taxes is partly shifted to employees: 
the long-run wage elasticity exceeds its short-run value. A rise in the average retention ratio 
however dampens out: the long-run elasticity is smaller in size than the short run. These results 
confirm the common view that shifting the tax burden takes time, and so Dalton’s law may hold 
in the long run only.  
The results of table 5.4 indicate that the sum of the elasticities of payroll tax and the average 
income retention rate is virtually -1:  1 1 1 − = + − + a s ε ε . Hence we may rewrite a log linear wage 
equation like (5.1) in terms of gross wage costs or net wages: 
u p p t q t W
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  (5.3) 
A wedge neutral shift in taxes may alter gross wage costs and net wages through a change in the 
marginal retention ratio and the net replacement ratio.  
Let’s examine the numerical consequences and compute benchmark values given the 
restriction on tax elasticities. This can be done by setting the R dummies for (1+s) and (1-ta) to 
1 (and F and C dummies to 0). Table 5.12 displays the results.    38 
Table 5.12  Benchmark values of macro real wage elasticities in equation (6.7), long and short term  
  The Netherlands  Anglo Saxon countries  Nordic countries       Other countries 
  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short 
                 
Labour productivity (q)  0.894  0.876  0.983  0.965  0.983  0.965  0.983  0.965 
Payroll tax(1+s)  – 0.687  – 0.294  – 0.629  – 0.236  – 0.659  – 0.266  – 0.638  – 0.245 
Average income tax (1-ta)  – 0.238  – 0.411  – 0.321  – 0.493  – 0.312  – 0.485  – 0.316  – 0.489 
Marginal income tax (1-tm)  0.272  0.272  0.200  0.200  0.246  0.246  0.011  0.011 
Consumer price (pc)  0.607  0.648  0.603  0.644  0.543  0.584  0.603  0.644 
Producer price (py)  0.388  0.329  0.445  0.386  0.544  0.484  0.445  0.386 
Replacement ratio (ρ)  0.198  0.198  0.057  0.057  0.035  0.035  0.094  0.094 
Unemployment rate (u)  – 0.095  – 0.095  – 0.057  – 0.057  – 0.105  – 0.105  – 0.094  – 0.094 
 
The sum of  s + 1 ε and  a − 1 ε is indeed close to 1 in the long run. The elasticity of the replacement 
ratio declines but is still above 0.2 in most countries. Elasticities of labour productivity and 
prices are somewhat higher, and the unemployment elasticity is stable. 
Even a wedge neutral shift from payroll tax to income tax that does not change the average 
tax burden on the average wage, increases the tax burden on unemployment and welfare 
benefits: the net replacement ratio declines. This results from the reduction in the tax credit or 
tax exemption that is imposed to induce the shift. This can be avoided of course, but in that case 
the marginal tax rate will increase. From the table it follows that both the elasticity of the 
marginal income retention rate and the elasticity of the replacement rate differ from zero. So a 
wedge neutral tax shift will affect wages through changes in the tax structure and the 
replacement ratio. There may also be indirect effects though changes in (un)employment and 
output prices.    39 
6  Conclusions 
A meta analysis is a quantitative instrument to support a literature survey. Did it give any 
support? The answer is clearly yes. One of the merits of this meta analysis is that it shows that 
benchmark values of wage elasticities may differ from sample statistics like the mean and 
median. The reason is of course that variation is not just white noise, it is in part systematic. 
One of the conclusions is that part of the variation is due to different specifications of the 
reported wage equations. Moderator variables should not just include institutional, time or 
regional dummies, but also variables that account for completeness, parameter restrictions and 
normalization. Moreover, the dynamic specification of the wage equation matters. Although not 
surprising, long and short-run values of elasticities may differ. The impact of changes in the 
average retention rate declines in the long run, while the impact of payroll taxes and 
productivity changes gain strength in the long term.  
The results for the unemployment elasticity of pay support those found in the literature on 
wage curves. Sample means, median values and elasticities obtained from this analysis are close 
to the findings of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), Nijkamp and Poot (2005) and Clar et al 
(2007).  
From the sensitivity analysis, it follows that some conclusions are rather robust: (i) the size 
of the unemployment elasticity of pay in Anglo Saxon countries is roughly half of that in other 
countries; (ii) short and long-term values of tax elasticities differ; (iii) the sum of the wage 
elasticities of pc and py is close to 1; this also holds in case of the real wage (iv) the sum of the 
long-run tax elasticities 1 s ε + and  1 a ε − is close to -1.    40   41 
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